英语翻译不要用在线翻译翻的,句子根本就不通,自己翻不来.新注册的号 Critics of these capital r

英语翻译
不要用在线翻译翻的,句子根本就不通,自己翻不来.新注册的号
Critics of these capital regulations have rightly pointed to these cap-
ital requirements as having contributed to the subprime crisis by per-
mitting banks to maintain insufficient amounts of equity capital per
unit of risk undertaken in their subprime holdings.
Investment banks were also permitted by capital regulations that
were less strict than those applying to commercial banks to engage in
subprime-related risk with insufficient budgeting of equity capital.
Investment banks faced capital regulations under SEC guidelines
that were similar to the more permissive Basel II rules that apply to
commercial banks outside the United States.Because those capital
regulations were less strict than capital regulations imposed on U.S.
banks,investment banks were able to lever their positions more than
commercial banks.Investment banks’ use of overnight repurchase
agreements as their primary source of finance also permitted them
to “ride the yield curve” when using debt to fund their risky asset
positions; in that respect,collateralized repos appeared to offer a
substitute for low-interest commercial bank deposits.2 But as the col-
lateral standing behind those repos declined in value and became
risky,“haircuts” associated with repo collateral became less favorable,
and investment banks were unable to roll over their repos positions,
a liquidity risk that added to their vulnerability and made their equi-
ty capital positions even more insufficient as risk buffers.
There is no doubt that the financial innovations associated with
securitization and repo finance were at least in part motivated by reg-
ulatory arbitrage.Furthermore,there is no doubt that if on-balance-
sheet commercial bank capital regulations had determined the
amount of equity budgeted by all subprime mortgage originators,
then the leverage ratios of the banking system would not have been
as large,and the liquidity risk from repo funding would have been
substantially less,both of which would have contributed to reducing
the magnitude of the financial crisis.
And yet,I do not agree with those who argue that the subprime
crisis is mainly a story of government “errors of omission,” which
allowed banks to avoid regulatory discipline due to the insufficient
application of existing on-balance-sheet commercial bank capital
regulations to the risks undertaken by investment banks and off-balance-sheet conduits.The main story of the subprime crisis
instead is one of government “errors of commission,” which were far
more important in generating the huge risks and large losses that
brought down the U.S.financial system.

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