英语翻译One of the responsibilities of compensation committees i

英语翻译
One of the responsibilities of compensation committees is to evaluate the performance of executives and make recommendations with respect to bonus compensation.While bonus compensation,in general,is not the largest component of compensation,it does play an integral role in management control systems by linking compensation policies to strategic objectives (Indjejikian and Nanda,2002; Ittner et al.,1997).4 Bushman et al.(1996) contend that an important function of compensation committees is to expand the set of feasible criteria for determining executives’ bonus compensation beyond traditional corporate performance variables.Consistent with this view,there is a trend in practice towards using a broad portfolio of financial and non-financial performance measures to evaluate executives’performance (Bushman and Smith,2001; Ittner et al.,1997; Ittner and Larcker,1998,2001; Kaplan and Norton,1996; Sim and Koh,2001).
We examine the possibility that accounting fundamentals are included in (or correlated with) the broad portfolio of financial performance measures used to evaluate executives.Although empirical evidence indicates that accounting fundamentals are leading indicators of earnings (Abarbanell and Bushee,1998) and stock returns (Abarbanell and Bushee,1998; Mohanram,2005; Piotroski,2000),and that the information in accounting fundamentals is incremental to earnings (Lev and Thiagarajan,1993; Abarbanell and Bushee,1998),no prior research has examined the link between accounting fundamentals and executive bonus compensation.In addition,similar to stock price performance and accounting earnings,compensation committees incur no incremental contracting costs for using the accounting fundamentals we identify in our analyses.
To the extent that accounting fundamentals sharpen performance measurement and provide information that is incremental to stock prices and accounting earnings,compensation committees may use these additional performance measures to evaluate executives and make recommendations about bonus compensation.However,we are aware of no evidence indicating that accounting fundamentals are actually used as contractual arguments in bonus compensation arrangements.Prior research indicates that the performance measures used in executive compensation arrangements may be observable only to the contracting parties (Baker et al.,1994; Hayes and Schaefer,2000) and that firms rarely disclose the details of bonus contracts (Gaver et al.,1995; Perry and Zenner,2001; Reitenga et al.,2002).As a result,we are unable to determine the extent to which accounting fundamentals are actually used in bonus contracts.

的职能之一是薪酬委员会主管人员和性能的评价提出建议就奖金补偿.当奖金补偿,一般来说,不是补偿的最大的组成部分,它确实在其中扮演一个整合的角色管理控制系统连接的补偿政策战略目标,Indjejikian;2002年,Nanda Ittner苏达权等,1997)0.4族孙俐.(1996)认为薪酬委员会的一个重要功能是扩展套行之有效的经理人的认定标准,跨越传统的公司绩效奖金补偿变量.根据这一观点,有一种趋势在实践中广泛使用的公事包对财务及非财务业绩指标,评价高管'performance(族和史密斯Ittner等,2001;《1997;Ittner和Larcker,1998年,2001年;卡普兰和诺顿出版社,1996版;Sim和Koh,2001).
我们仔细阅读的可能性,包括会计基础与(或)广大的公事包用来评价财务绩效措施的高级管理人员.虽然实证研究表明,会计基础都领先指标的Abarbanell和Bushee盈利(股票收益,1998)和(Abarbanell和Bushee杂志,2002;Mohanram,2005;Piotroski,2000),会计信息是渐进的基本盈利(列弗与Thiagarajan杂志,1996;Abarbanell和Bushee,1998),没有之前的研究已经研究了会计基础之间的联系和执行奖金补偿.此外,类似于股票价格性能和会计收益,而薪酬委员会没有增量承包成本会计基础,我们使用把我们的分析.
会计基础,这在一定程度上提高绩效评价和提供的信息是渐进式到股票的价格和会计收入,薪资委员会可以使用这些额外的性能测试评估主管和使建议奖金补偿.然而,据我们所知,没有证据表明会计基本论点实际上是作为合同作为额外补偿计划.先前的研究表明,业绩指标,用于行政补偿处理可被觉察只有缔约双方(贝克、苏达权等,1994年成立;海耶斯和一个促进考试,2000),公司的细节极少会公布奖金合同(Gaver苏达权等,2000;.佩里、杂志,2001;Zenner Reitenga苏达权等,2002年).因此,我们无法确定,在一定程度上,会计基础都实际上用于奖励合同.