英语翻译However,other studies suggest that bank size does not ne

英语翻译
However,other studies suggest that bank size does not necessarily need to decrease small business lending.For example,Strahan and Weston (1998) examined the effects of bank M&A on small business lending,and found that the M&A between small banks increased lending to small enterprises.Even though China has not experienced M&A,a similar phenomenon is the reduction of local branches during the covered sample period; hence,the bank size of local branches may not have a definite impact on small business lending.Berger,Rosen,and Udell (2001) studied the relationship between lending to SMEs and banks’ share of the local loan market.They found that the share of small business lending is roughly in proportion to small banks’ loan market share.Such phenomenon motivates us to study small business lending in China from the perspective of competition in terms of loan market structure.
A study that is of particular relevance to China is that of Berger and DeYoung (2001).They found that it is difficult for bank holding companies to control the efficiency of small banks located at a significant distance from their headquarters.This is consistent with the possibility that relationship lending may be difficult to operate from afar.As China’s financial system is dominated by four main state-owned banks and the headquarters are quite far from county-level local banks,the efficiency of small banks in making small business loans needs careful investigation.In addition to physical distance,other measures of distance can be hierarchical levels of the banks,and the loan approval rights that the local branches possess.If there are more layers between the headquarters and the local branches,relationship lending will be more difficult.On the other hand,if the local bank has 100% self-loan approval right,its physical distance from its headquarters and the bank hierarchical level are less important.China’s financial system provides enough variation in loan approval rights to study its impact on small business lending.
Berger,Klapper,and Udell (2001) also raised the distressed-bank barriers hypothesis.That is,banks in financial distress are less likely to lend to small businesses.Such negative effect will be exemplified if financial distress is directly linked to the income of loan managers because the risks of these loans cannot be easily verified.Researchers also tested whether tougher supervisory standards in examining bank portfolios will decrease relationship lending.While conclusions were mixed,they generally found that tougher standards decrease small business lending.Whether such an observation applies to China,however,remains an open question.

然而,其他研究表明,银行规模并不一定要减少小企业的贷款.例如,斯特拉汉和Weston（1998）研究了银行并购对小企业贷款的影响,并发现该并购小银行之间增加小企业贷款.尽管中国没有经历过并购,类似的现象是当地分支机构在样本期间内减少,因此,地方银行分行的大小可能不会对小企业贷款一定的影响.伯杰,罗森和德尔（2001）研究了向中小型企业之间的借贷和银行贷款的当地市场份额的关系.他们发现,小企业贷款份额的比例大约是小银行的贷款市场份额.这种现象促使我们研究从竞争的角度,贷款结构方面在中国市场的小企业贷款.
一项研究是对中国具有特别意义的是,对伯杰和德扬（2001年）.他们发现,这是为银行控股公司难以控制的小银行的效率在其总部从显着的距离.这与关系型贷款的可能性相一致,即可能难以操作远方.作为中国的金融体系主要由四个国有银行和总部为主的还有较大的差距县级地方银行,小银行的小企业贷款作出效率需要仔细调查.除了身体距离,距离其他措施可以为银行的等级,以及贷款审批权的地方分支机构拥有.如果有与总部和地方分支机构多层次,关系型贷款将更加困难.另一方面,如果本地银行有100％自营贷款审批权,它从它的总部和银行分层级物理距离是那么重要了.中国的金融系统提供的贷款审批权,研究其对小企业贷款的影响足够的变化.
伯杰,克拉珀和德尔（2001）也提出了困扰银行的障碍假说.也就是说,在金融危机的可能性较小的银行贷款给小企业.这种负面影响将体现,如果金融危机有直接联系的贷款经理的收入,因为这些不是轻易可以被验证的贷款风险.研究人员还测试了在审查银行是否会降低投资组合的贷款更严格的监管标准的关系.虽然结论不一,但他们普遍认为更严格的标准降低小企业贷款.不管这种看法也适用于中国,但是,仍然是一个悬而未决的问题.