作业帮谁能帮我翻译一下,跪谢
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谁能帮我翻译一下,跪谢
In this period, audit firms have also behaved in a manner consistent with awareness of potential threats to auditor independence, and hence to reputation,from provision of NAS. Following the Enron audit failure and the disclosure of the level of NAS supplied to Enron by auditors Andersen, the major audit firms publicly signalled a change in behaviour through a series of announcements on the future conduct of their consulting business. PricewaterhouseCoopers announced the decision to “spin off” its consultancy business in spring 2002(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002). 2 On 3rd February 2002 Andersen announced it would “no longer accept assignments from publicly traded U.S. audit clients for the implementation of financial reporting computer systems and [would] no longer accept engagements to provide internal audit services to publicly traded U.S. audit clients” (Andersen, 2002). Meanwhile, on 6th February 2002, Deloitte Touche announced the decision to “separate” Deloitte Consulting from its core auditing business because of “market perception [over] public concern about auditor independence” (Deloitte, 2002). Auditees have responded similarly to the perception of reduced auditor independence: for example, Unilever stated that it was to review the joint provision of audit and non-audit services (BBC, 2002) whilst Walt Disney Corporation announced no further consultancy assignments would be awarded to its auditors (BBC, 2002).
Whilst the above actions are consistent with a relationship between NAS and actual or perceived impairment of auditor independence, no such consensus exists in the academic literature (Schneider, Church and Ely, 2006). In part this is due to choice of research design in modelling economic bonding, some researchers focusing on the relationship between auditee’s NAS fees and audit fees (Frankel, Johnson and Nelson, 2002) others (Ashbaugh et al, 2003) recognising that bonding is a function of both total fees paid by the auditee, for NAS and audit combined, and the total fee income of the audit firm. The second approach is adopted in this paper and is referred to as “total relative fee”.
In this period, audit firms have also behaved in a manner consistent with awareness of potential threats to auditor independence, and hence to reputation,from provision of NAS. Following the Enron audit failure and the disclosure of the level of NAS supplied to Enron by auditors Andersen, the major audit firms publicly signalled a change in behaviour through a series of announcements on the future conduct of their consulting business. PricewaterhouseCoopers announced the decision to “spin off” its consultancy business in spring 2002(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002). 2 On 3rd February 2002 Andersen announced it would “no longer accept assignments from publicly traded U.S. audit clients for the implementation of financial reporting computer systems and [would] no longer accept engagements to provide internal audit services to publicly traded U.S. audit clients” (Andersen, 2002). Meanwhile, on 6th February 2002, Deloitte Touche announced the decision to “separate” Deloitte Consulting from its core auditing business because of “market perception [over] public concern about auditor independence” (Deloitte, 2002). Auditees have responded similarly to the perception of reduced auditor independence: for example, Unilever stated that it was to review the joint provision of audit and non-audit services (BBC, 2002) whilst Walt Disney Corporation announced no further consultancy assignments would be awarded to its auditors (BBC, 2002).
Whilst the above actions are consistent with a relationship between NAS and actual or perceived impairment of auditor independence, no such consensus exists in the academic literature (Schneider, Church and Ely, 2006). In part this is due to choice of research design in modelling economic bonding, some researchers focusing on the relationship between auditee’s NAS fees and audit fees (Frankel, Johnson and Nelson, 2002) others (Ashbaugh et al, 2003) recognising that bonding is a function of both total fees paid by the auditee, for NAS and audit combined, and the total fee income of the audit firm. The second approach is adopted in this paper and is referred to as “total relative fee”.
在此期间,审计事务所也表现的方式有潜在威胁的认识,审计师的独立性相一致,因而信誉,从NAS的规定.继安然公司审计失败和水平的NAS的披露提供的安达信审计的主要审计公司公开标志着安然通过了关于其咨询业务的未来进行公布一系列行为的改变.普华永道会计师事务所宣布,决定“分拆”的咨询公司在2002年春季（普华永道,2002年）.2在2002年2月3日宣布,将安徒生“,不再接受来自美国公开上市的审计客户的财务报告的计算机系统和[将]不再接受约定提供内部审计服务,审计公开上市的美国客户”（安达信执行任务,2002）.与此同时,2002年2月6日,德勤宣布,决定“独立”,从审计业务的核心,因为“市场的看法德勤咨询公司[对]对审计师的独立性公众关注”（德勤,2002）.审计对象的反应同样的减少,审计师的独立性的看法：例如,联合利华公司说,它是审查审计和联合提供非审计服务（英国广播公司,2002年）,而迪斯尼公司宣布,没有进一步的咨询任务,获该公司的审计（英国广播公司,2002年）.
虽然上述行动是与NAS和实际的或可能的核数师的独立性受损,没有这样的共识关系是一致的存在（施奈德,教会和伊利,2006年）的学术文献.这部分是由于经济结合模型的研究设计的选择,一些研究人员之间的审计单位的NAS费和审计费（弗兰克尔,约翰逊和纳尔逊,2002）等关系为重点（阿什博等,2003）认识到绑定是一项职能由被审计单位支付的总额均费,NAS和审计相结合,审计企业的总收费收入.第二种方法是采用本文件和被称为“总相对费”.
虽然上述行动是与NAS和实际的或可能的核数师的独立性受损,没有这样的共识关系是一致的存在（施奈德,教会和伊利,2006年）的学术文献.这部分是由于经济结合模型的研究设计的选择,一些研究人员之间的审计单位的NAS费和审计费（弗兰克尔,约翰逊和纳尔逊,2002）等关系为重点（阿什博等,2003）认识到绑定是一项职能由被审计单位支付的总额均费,NAS和审计相结合,审计企业的总收费收入.第二种方法是采用本文件和被称为“总相对费”.