作业帮保险英语论文翻译(二) 急! 在线等!
来源：学生作业帮 编辑：作业帮 分类：英语作业 时间：2024/05/12 16:53:09
保险英语论文翻译(二) 急! 在线等!
如题,请帮我把下面关于保险的论文翻译成中文. 很急. 谢谢.
In this paper we analyze the effects of search frictions on the functioning of health insurance markets. Our study has both a theoretical and empirical dimension. We begin our theoretical discussion in Section 2 by sketching a simple model of the search process for health insurance. In our model the law of one price does not hold. Instead there exists an equilibrium distribution of premiums (for identical policies and employer groups), an equilibrium in which the price of insurance exceeds its marginal cost so that some consumer surplus accrues to insurers.3 Our equilibrium is also characterized by excess turnover in insurerpolicy holder relationships. In an employer-based health insurance system some turnover is inevitable, of course, owing to individual job loss or change. The distinctive implication of our search framework is that there will be significant additional turnover in which entire groups of employees drop their current insurance because their employers seek (and find) less expensive plans. If the distribution of prices is sufficiently large, high rates of employer group turnover can persist even when there are significant costs to switching insurers.
In Section 3 we examine the empirical predictions of the search model using three data sources: the Household Survey component of the Community Tracking Study (CTS), proprietary information from the enrollment records of a large regional insurer, and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer Health Insurance Survey (EHIS). We observe that there are high rates of health insurance turnover, roughly 20 percent per year on average, and we find that the rate of turnover is particularly high among fully insured employers, for whom search frictions are likely to be relatively high. Importantly, from the perspective of our theory, roughly half of this turnover is due to cancellations by entire employer groups.4 As for the dispersion in premiums, a considerable amount of price dispersion remains after controlling for variation in product features and employer characteristics. Consistent with the presence of these frictions, the variance in the residual distribution of premiums is greatest in the fully insured market segment where search frictions are likely to be greatest. We estimate that for the average policy in the fully insured market, search frictions are sufficient to transfer approximately one quarter of the consumer surplus from policy holders to insurers. This amounts to a transfer of $32.5 billion dollars in 1997.
如题,请帮我把下面关于保险的论文翻译成中文. 很急. 谢谢.
In this paper we analyze the effects of search frictions on the functioning of health insurance markets. Our study has both a theoretical and empirical dimension. We begin our theoretical discussion in Section 2 by sketching a simple model of the search process for health insurance. In our model the law of one price does not hold. Instead there exists an equilibrium distribution of premiums (for identical policies and employer groups), an equilibrium in which the price of insurance exceeds its marginal cost so that some consumer surplus accrues to insurers.3 Our equilibrium is also characterized by excess turnover in insurerpolicy holder relationships. In an employer-based health insurance system some turnover is inevitable, of course, owing to individual job loss or change. The distinctive implication of our search framework is that there will be significant additional turnover in which entire groups of employees drop their current insurance because their employers seek (and find) less expensive plans. If the distribution of prices is sufficiently large, high rates of employer group turnover can persist even when there are significant costs to switching insurers.
In Section 3 we examine the empirical predictions of the search model using three data sources: the Household Survey component of the Community Tracking Study (CTS), proprietary information from the enrollment records of a large regional insurer, and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer Health Insurance Survey (EHIS). We observe that there are high rates of health insurance turnover, roughly 20 percent per year on average, and we find that the rate of turnover is particularly high among fully insured employers, for whom search frictions are likely to be relatively high. Importantly, from the perspective of our theory, roughly half of this turnover is due to cancellations by entire employer groups.4 As for the dispersion in premiums, a considerable amount of price dispersion remains after controlling for variation in product features and employer characteristics. Consistent with the presence of these frictions, the variance in the residual distribution of premiums is greatest in the fully insured market segment where search frictions are likely to be greatest. We estimate that for the average policy in the fully insured market, search frictions are sufficient to transfer approximately one quarter of the consumer surplus from policy holders to insurers. This amounts to a transfer of $32.5 billion dollars in 1997.
我maggie