作业帮 > 英语 > 作业

英语翻译accounting standard setters commonly perceive earnings m

来源:学生作业帮 编辑:作业帮 分类:英语作业 时间:2024/03/28 20:59:10
英语翻译
accounting standard setters commonly perceive earnings management as undesirable and attempt to reduce management's discretion for earnings management by tightening accounting standards.For example,in late 2003 the International Accounting tandards Board eliminated accounting options in several standards with what it called an improvements project" (IASB 2003).Other ways to tighten standards are to limit the impact of judgment by managers (and auditors),e.g.,by requiring measurement with trustworthy,but perhaps less relevant,numbers and by providing more "bright-line" rules or detailed guidance.The discussion of principles-based versus rules-based standards is in line
with this reasoning.
As noted by several authors,including Schipper (2003),tighter accounting standards may lead to a substitution effect in that the reduction of accounting earnings management is met with increased real earnings management,thereby counteracting the standard-setter's intention.In contrast to accounting earnings management,real earnings management consumes real resources.However,the sources and consequences of such substitution effects are seldom explicated.In this paper,we study the effects of tighter accounting standards in a capital market setting and consider the following questions:Do tighter standards im-
prove earnings quality?Can tighter accounting standards indeed reduce earnings management?How do they affect the cost of earnings management in a capital market equilibrium?
We distinguish between accounting and real earnings management; accounting earnings management includes the way accounting standards are applied to record given transactions and events,whereas real earnings management changes the timing or structuring of real transactions.Real earnings management implies that the manager deviates from an otherwise optimal plan of actions only to affect earnings,thus,imposing a real cost to the firm.We argue that an accounting standard setter can tighten standards to restrict the discretion for accounting earnings management,but can do little to restrict real earnings management.
会计准则制定机构普遍认为不可取的,为了减少管理层的盈余管理的自由裁量权,通过收紧会计准则盈余管理.例如,在2003年年底,国际会计标准协商委员会取消了几个标准的会计选择与它所谓的改进项目“(国际会计准则委员会2003年).其他方式收紧标准限制的影响判断(由经理及核数师),例如,需要测量与值得信赖的,但也许不太相关,数字和提供更多的“光明行”的规则或详细的指导.讨论的原则与规则为基础的标准是一致的
这个道理.
正如几位作家,包括席佩尔(2003)所指出的,更严格的会计标准可能会导致在遇到实际收入增加的管理,减少会计盈余管理的替代效应,从而抵消的标准制定者的意图.在会计盈余管理相比,实际收入管理消耗的实际资源.然而,这种替代效应的来源和后果是很少的阐释.在本文中,我们研究资本市场的设置更严格的会计准则的影响,并考虑以下问题:执行更严格的标准IM-
证明盈余质量?更严格的会计标准,确实可以减少盈余管理吗?他们如何影响盈余管理的成本在资本市场的均衡?
我们区分会计和管理的实际收入;会计盈余管理包括会计标准适用于记录交易和事件,而实际收入管理,真正交易的时间或结构更改的方式.实际收入管理意味着经理偏离最优方案的行动,否则不仅影响盈利,因此,征收实际成本的firm.We认为会计标准制定者可以收紧标准,以限制会计盈余管理的自由裁量权,但可以做一点限制管理的实际收入.